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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF TREASURY RULES
AND REGULATIONS
DAVID W. BALL*

I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps one of the most unsettling areas of the law for the tax lawyer
is retroactive application of Treasury regulations and rulings under Section
7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).' For lawyers steeped in
notions of due process and fundamental fairness, it is shocking that a
taxpayer can pay his taxes in accordance with a current Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) interpretation, and the Commissioner 2 subsequently can
change his position in reliance on a new regulation or ruling applied
retroactively.3 Then, the Commissioner can assert a deficiency against
the taxpayer. 4 Such unsettling action results from the exercise of statutorily
granted discretionary authority.5

This Article explores the limitations on the exercise of the Commissioner's broad discretionary authority to apply rules and regulations retroactively. 6 First, the Article examines the current statutory and regulatory
*Associate, Poole, Tinnin and Martin, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico. This Article was written
in 1985 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an LL.M. degree in Taxation at the University
of Florida Graduate Tax Program. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance provided by Professor David Richardson, Director of the Graduate Tax Program at the University of
Florida, and Sandra Gilley and James Burke, Lead Articles Editors for the New Mexico Law Review.
1. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 7805(b) (1967).Section 7805(a) of the Code authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary
by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue." I.R.C. § 7805(a). Section 7805(b)
expands the Secretary's authority to include retroactive effect. Section 7805(b) states: "The Secretary
may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue
laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect." I.R.C. § 7805(b). This language generally provides
that regulations and rulings will be retroactive unless the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes
otherwise.
2. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. I.R.C. § 7802(a). He has such duties and powers as may be prescribed
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
3. This has occurred in numerous instances. For recent examples, see Becker v. Commissioner,
751 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1984) and Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Becker, 751 F.2d at 148; Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d at 974.
5. See supra note 1 and infra notes 7-15 and accompanying text for discussions on the Commissioner's discretionary authority to give retroactive effect to rulings and regulations.
6. This Article does not focus on the distinction in treatment between regulations, rulings and
other types of decisions. If pursuing this point, be aware that, in many instances, the Commissioner
has limited his authority to apply certain types of decisions retroactively and that judicial decisions
recognize numerous distinctions between various types of decisions. For an excellent treatment of
these distinctions, see Nolan and Thuronyi, Retroactive Application of Changes in IRS or Treasury
DepartmentPosition, 61 TAXES 777 (1983); Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance
and Retroactivity--A View from Within, 43 TAXES 756 (1965), reprinted in Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep.
(CCH) 67,083 (1985).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

laws. Second, the Article discusses the policy interests of both the taxpayer and the IRS regarding retroactive application of IRS regulations
and rulings. Third, the Article examines the historical development of
limitations on the Commissioner's discretionary authority in this area.
Fourth, the Article analyzes several recently decided cases that indicate
a new trend toward closer scrutiny of the Commissioner's authority.
Finally, the Article suggests that the courts should continue this trend in
the interest of fairness to the taxpayer.
II. CURRENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY LAW
Under Section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Secretary of
the Treasury may prescribe needed rules and regulations.7 Section 7805(b)
expands the Secretary's authority to include retroactive effect. 8 The broad
authority granted under Section 7805(a) and (b) is noteworthy. The Secretary has the statutory power to give retroactive effect to all rulings and
regulations, as the regulation applies retroactively unless the Secretary
provides otherwise.'
Treasury Regulation Section 301.7805-1(b) provides for delegation of
the authority from the Secretary to the Commissioner but otherwise echoes
the theme of the statute. '0 Under this regulation the Commissioner, like
the Secretary, has the power to exercise discretion in determining when,
and if, a ruling or regulation applies without retroactive effect. 1 ' Thus,
absent express prospective language, the ruling or regulation is retroactive
in application.
Regulations fall into two categories: legislative and interpretive. Under
7. I.R.C. § 7805(a). See supra note I for the provision's express statutory language.
8. I.R.C. § 7805(b). See supra note I for the provision's express statutory language.
9. I.R.C. § 7805(b). The provision states that "[t]he Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any,
to which any ruling or regulation . . . shall be applied without retroactive effect." Id. (emphasis
added). This language implies that the regulation will have retroactive effect unless the Secretary
expressly prescribes otherwise. In contrast to the IRS's current position asserting broad authority in
favor of retroactivity, limitations on retroactivity were first proposed by the Treasury itself. Notes
on the Revenue Act of 1918, reprinted in Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws,
892 (1st ed. 1938). In 1919, the Secretary presented to Congress an instance where regulations had
induced vendors to sell particular goods without collecting certain taxes. The regulations were later
revised and the Commissioner was required to collect the tax from the seller retroactively because
he had no discretionary power in the matter. Section 7805(b) assumed its present form in Section
506 of the Revenue Act of 1934. Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680, See H. R. Rep. No. 704,
73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 48 (1934).
10. Treas. Reg. 301.7805-1(b) (1986).
11. The Regulation states:
The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent,
if any, to which any regulation or Treasury decision relating to the internal revenue
laws shall be applied without retroactive effect. The Commissioner may prescribe
the extent, if any, to which any ruling relating to the internal revenue laws, issued
by or pursuant to authorization from him, shall be applied without retroactive
effect.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1(b).
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the 1954 Code, Congress granted the Secretary specific authority in certain
code sections to write detailed rules.12 These are generally described as
legislative regulations and have the force and effect of law, unless the
regulations exceed the scope of authority granted by the statute, are
contrary to the statute or are unreasonable. 3 Although the policy is not
set forth in any official pronouncement, the Treasury usually applies
legislative regulations, or changes to such regulations, prospectively only.' 4
Interpretive regulations comprise the second category. The Secretary
has broad authority to issue interpretive regulations under Section 7805(a).
He has discretion to make such regulations retroactive under Section
7805(b). 5 While interpretive regulations do not have the force and effect
of law, the courts generally accord these regulations great weight. 6 The
courts, however, have not distinguished between legislative and interpretive regulations within the context of Section 7805(b) retroactivity. '7
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Limitations on retroactivity were first proposed by the Treasury itself.' 8
In 1919, the Secretary presented to Congress an instance where regulations induced vendors to sell particular goods without collecting certain
taxes.' 9 The regulations were later revised and the Commissioner was
required to collect the tax from the seller retroactively because he had
no discretionary power in the matter 20 The Secretary suggested a change,
noting that "in cases
like the aforementioned it very frequently works a
2
great hardship. , '

Discretion to apply regulations and Treasury decisions nonretroactively
was granted to the Secretary and Commissioner by Section 1314 in the
Revenue Act of 1921.22 After further changes in 1928,23 the current Section
12. Rogovin, supra note 6, at 758. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1502 (1982) which deals with consolidated
returns.
13. Rogovin, supra note 6, at 758; Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d 972, 976 (5th Cir. 1977).
14. Nolan and Thuronyi, supra note 6, at 783.
15. Rogovin, supra note 6, at 762-63.
16. Id. Courts have accorded such regulations weight because the Treasury is charged with the
administration of the statute. See, e.g., Yarbro v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1984).
17. Rogovin, supra note 6, at 760. The courts have not offered explanations for failure to make
such a distinction. This is unusual given the different purposes underlying legislative and interpretive
regulations.
18. Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, reprinted in Seidman, Legislative History of Federal
Income Tax Laws, 886 n. 1 (1st ed. 1938).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The apparent hardship was that the vendors had to bear the taxes intended for the purchasers.
22. 42 Stat. 227, 314. See H. R. Rep. No. 350, 67th. Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1921); S.Rep. No.
275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1921).
23. Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 791, 874, §605. The Revenue Act of 1928 amendment consisted
of deletion of a reference to court decisions and language concerning discretion but did not significantly alter the meaning of the law.
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7805(b) assumed its present form in Section 506 of the Revenue Act of
1934.24

Section 7805(b) finds its roots in the declaratory theory of jurisprudence
formulated by Sir William Blackstone.25 According to the theory, judges
do not make the law, instead they find the law and declare it to the
litigants.26 The newly found law is applied retroactively because it is
deemed to be the correct law. As applied to Treasury regulations, the
theory provides that the statute is the law and the regulation merely an
interpretation of the law. If the regulation is a mistaken interpretation of
the law, the Commissioner may retroactively correct it to conform to the
law. 27
IV. CASE DEVELOPMENT
A. Introduction
Section 7805(b) and the corresponding regulation have not undergone
change in many years. Consequently, the legal development of retroactive
application of treasury regulations is largely in case law". Numerous
court decisions and different theories 9 have emerged to limit discretionary
authority.
The courts have historically accorded extraordinary deference to the
discretion of the Commissioner under Section 7805(b).3" The courts,
however, under a variety of legal theories, have denied retroactivity where
the consequence to the taxpayer is extremely harsh,3 1 where there is
unequal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers,3 2 or where the result
24. Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680. See H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 48
(1934).
25. Comment, Limits on Retroactive DecisionMaking by the InternalRevenue Service: Redefining
Abuse of Discretion Under Section 7805(b), 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 529, 530 (1976).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965) where the taxpayer alleged
reliance on an acquiescence which was later withdrawn retroactively. The Supreme Court ruled that
the taxpayer could not rely on a mistake of law. Id. at 76.
28. See, e.g., LeSavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3rd Cir. 1956); International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1028 (1966); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939).
29. The principal theories that have emerged to limit discretionary authority are abuse of discretion
and equitable estoppel discussed infra at text accompanying notes 35-40.
30. Nolan and Thuronyi, supra note 6, at 786. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 76
(1965); Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957).
31. See, e.g., LeSavoy, 238 F.2d at 594, where the court held that the Commissioner had exceeded
the bounds of permissible discretion where he retroactively denied a tax exemption to a foundation
and "made it liable for a tax bill so large as to wipe it out of existence."
32. See, e.g., IBM, 343 F.2d at 921-23, where the Court of Claims held that the Commissioner
had abused his discretion by treating similarly situated taxpayers differently where IBM's sole
competitor had received a private ruling exempting certain products from an excise tax and IBM
had applied for a similar ruling but never received it.
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would otherwise be extremely unfair to the taxpayer. 3 No clearly developed and widely followed criteria have yet emerged for determining
whether a regulation shall be applied retroactively or limited to prospective effect."
Two broad theories have on occasion received judicial approval: abuse
of discretion and equitable estoppel.35 The two theories rely on similar
factors and the courts have not always clearly distinguished them.36 There
are some differences, however. Equitable estoppel is a purely equitable
remedy and does not rely on the statutory foundation of Section 7805(b),
as does the abuse of discretion approach.3 7 Second, since Dixon v. United
States38 and Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner39 , courts have
couched holdings in abuse of discretion language, although it is evident
that the estoppel elements of reliance and detriment have been important,
if not essential.'
B. Abuse of Discretion
The Commissioner has general authority under Section 7805(b) to apply
regulations retroactively, but if he is deemed to have abused his discretion
in doing so, the regulation will be barred from retroactive effect. 4 Abuse
33. See, e.g., Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2nd Cir. 1971)
where the court indicated in dicta that it would be abusive to apply a regulation retroactively to
affect pending litigation. See supra text accompanying note 76 for exact language of opinion. See
also Continental Bank v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 918, 923-25 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 688 F.2d 819
(3rd Cir. 1982) where the court held that a regulation may not fix a deadline for making an election
where that deadline has already passed at the time the regulation was promulgated.
34. ButseeAnderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 1977) (provided
definite criteria for review by drawing from earlier case law), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).
35. See, e.g., LeSavoy, 238 F.2d at 593 (abuse of discretion) and Interstate Fire Insurance Co.
v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 586, 599 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (equitable estoppel), affd per curiam
339 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1964).
36. See, e.g., Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989 (1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir.
1983).
37. However, in reviewing the Commissioner's authority to apply regulations retroactively, the
courts have generally applied equitable principles such as reliance and detriment. See, e.g., Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d 972; LeSavoy, 238 F.2d 589. See also Comment, supra note 25.
38. 381 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1965). In Dixon the taxpayer alleged that he had relied on a published
acquiescence in selling notes and claiming long term capital gain. Id. The Supreme Court held that,
although the acquiescence was not withdrawn until after the transaction, the Commissioner may
retroactively correct a mistake in the application of tax laws to particular transactions even where
the taxpayer had ruled to his own detriment on the Commissioner's mistake. Id. at 79.
39. 353 U.S. 180 (1957). In Auto Club of Michigan the Supreme Court sustained the Commissioner's retroactive revocation of the taxpayers' exemption granted by an earlier private ruling. The
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the
Commissioner of a mistake of law." Id. at 183.
40. See, e.g., LeSavoy, 238 F.2d 589; Newman v. Commissioner, 33 TCM 219 (1974); Elkins
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669 (1983). See also Comment, supra note 25 at 534.
41. See, e.g., Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d at 981, where the Fifth Circuit listed specific
criteria drawn from earlier decisions to determine whether the Commissioner had abused his discretion. See infra text accompanying note 79 for criteria considered by the Court.
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may be found in a variety of factual circumstances, including where
reliance has been induced with considerable resulting detriment,4 2 where
the purpose is to affect pending litigation4 3 and where unequal treatment
would result among similarly situated taxpayers."
A review of the cases suggests that abuse of discretion will be found
under the above circumstances only where the result is very harsh or
extremely unfair to a particular taxpayer.
LeSavoy Foundation v. Commissioner was the first case to adopt the
abuse of discretion review for retroactive application of Treasury decisions. LeSavoy concerned a charitable organization granted an exemption
from tax.45 The Commissioner retroactively revoked the exemption and
assessed a deficiency greater than the net worth of the organization.46 The
court held that such an action was an abuse of the Commissioner's discretion and denied assessment of the deficiency and penalties.47
Shortly thereafter, the abuse of discretion review was adopted by the
Supreme Court in Auto Club of Michigan.48 The Commissioner had publicly changed his position regarding the tax exemption of auto clubs in
1943, but did not revoke the taxpayer's exemption until 1945. 4' The
revocation was made effective to the date of the public announcement of
the policy change.5 Although the Court adopted the abuse of discretion
review, it held that no such abuse had occurred under the circumstances
and upheld the retroactive denial of the exemption to the date of the public
announcement. 1
The Supreme Court again considered retroactivity in Dixon v. United
States.52 In Dixon, the taxpayer alleged reliance on an acquiescence which
was withdrawn retroactively. 53 The Supreme Court ruled that the taxpayer
could not rely on a mistake of law and that, in any event, the acquiescence
may have been misinterpreted by the taxpayer. 5' The following language
42. See, e.g., LeSavoy, 238 F.2d at 594. The court refused to retroactively deny an exemption
where the tax deficiency assessed was greater than the net worth of the taxpayer.
43. See, e.g., Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., 453 F.2d at 303, where the court in dicta indicated it
would be an abuse of discretion for the Commissioner to retroactively apply a regulation to affect
pending litigation.
44. See, e.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 921-23
(Ct. Cl. 1965 ) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966) where the Court of Claims determined that the
Commissioner had abused his discretion when IBM's sole competitor had been granted favorable
tax treatment in a private ruling and IBM had been denied such treatment.
45. 238 F.2d at 590.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 594.
48. 353 U.S. at 186.
49. Id. at 181.
50. Id.
51. Id.at 186.
52. 381 U.S. at 70-71.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 76.
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from Dixon illustrates the declaratory theory and has been frequently
quoted by other cases where abuse is not found: "[t]his principle is no
more than a reflection of the fact that Congress, not the Commissioner,
prescribes the tax laws. The Commissioner's rulings have only such force
as Congress chooses to give them, and Congress has not given them the
force of law." 55
Seventeen years passed after LeSavoy before a court next found abuse
of discretion. 6 In Newman v. Commissioner, the taxpayer received temporary alimony of $200 per week.5 7 In fixing the sum, the court assumed
that this amount would be subject to tax. 8 The marriage was later annulled
and support was set at $150 per week. 59 The reduction in weekly payments
was granted partially in reliance on a revenue ruling which provided that
payments made pursuant to an annulment order would not be taxable
income to the taxpayer. 6' The taxpayer later received a letter from the
district director affirming that the support received pursuant to the order
of annulment was not taxable income to her.6 In 1971, the Commissioner
changed his position and acquiesced to a decision which held that such
support payments would be taxable income. 62 The Commissioner then
sought to assert a deficiency against the taxpayer.63 The Tax Court recognized that as a matter of law the payments were taxable income but
refused to allow the Commissioner to apply the acquiescence retroactively.' The court concluded that the taxpayer had justifiably relied on
the revenue ruling and the letter from the district director and that the
taxpayer received less in support than she otherwise would have received. 65 The court concluded that under such circumstances it would be
"grossly inequitable" to assess deficiencies retroactively.66 The court also
specifically noted that in Auto Club of Michigan,67 the Commissioner had
retroactively revoked the exemption only to the date that the change had
been made public. 6"
In several cases, taxpayers have successfully contended that the Service
55. Id. at 73. Dixon and Automobile Club of Michigan are probably the two most frequently cited
cases on Section 7805(b) retroactivity and have set the stage for denial of retroactivity in most cases.
56. Comment, supra note 25, at 536.
57. 33 T.C.M. 219, 220 (1974).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 221.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 223.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 353 U.S. 180 (1957)
68. 33 T.C.M. at 222. In Newman, the Commissioner had asserted a deficiency for the time
period prior to the change in his position. Id. at 221.
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has abused its discretion in unjustifiably discriminating against certain
taxpayers.69 The leading case is InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.
v. United States, in which Remington Rand, the sole competitor of International Business Machines (IBM) was given a ruling exempting certain business machines from tax, while IBM applied for a ruling, did not
receive it, and was required to pay the tax.7" The Court of Claims held
that the Commissioner had abused his discretion in not granting IBM the
same treatment as its competitor.7"
The Commissioner's discretion may also be limited where the retroactive effect would change settled law. This limitation has been developed
in the closely related legislative reenactment and longstanding regulation
doctrines. In Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the Supreme Court
recognized the legislative reenactment doctrine, holding that the power
to change a regulation retroactively could not be exercised, where, by
repeated reenactment of the statute, Congress had given its sanction to
the existing regulation.7 2 The longstanding regulation doctrine received
Supreme Court approval in National Lead Co. v. United States.73 The
longstanding regulation doctrine provides that a regulation in effect for
a substantial time should not be changed retroactively.
The legislative reenactment and longstanding regulation doctrines are
manifestations of the fundamental inquiry into whether the taxpayer relied
on settled law. Although the doctrines have been given some consideration
by the courts, settled law alone has not been sufficient to limit Commissioner discretion. The taxpayer will also have to establish reliance and
harsh impact.74
Taxpayers have argued for abuse of discretion successfully on narrow
factual patterns where the result has been grossly unfair. Thus, in Chock
Full O' Nuts Corp. v. United States the Second Circuit indicated, in dicta,
that it would be abusive to apply a regulation retroactively to affect
litigation. 75 The Chock Full 0' Nuts court stated:
...[Tlihe Commissioner may not take advantage of his power to
promulgate retroactive regulations during the course of a litigation
for the purpose of providing himself with a defense based on the
presumption of validity accorded to such regulations."
ContinentalBank v. United States is a second example of such a narrow
factual pattern. Continental Bank held that a regulation may not fix a
69. See, e.g., Farmers and Merchants Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406, 409 (4th Cir. 1973).
70. 343 F.2d 914, 916 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
71. Id. at 923. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30 for further analysis of IBM.
72. 306 U.S. 110, 117 (1939).
73. 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920).
74. See, e.g., Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 1001; Dixon, 381 U.S. at 79-80; Anderson, Clayton &
Co., 562 F.2d at 981.
75. 453 F.2d at 303.
76. Id.
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deadline for making an election where that deadline has already passed
at the time the regulation was promulgated. 77
In Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. UnitedStates, the Fifth Circuit attempted
to provide definite criteria for review.78 The Anderson, Clayton court set
forth the following factors, all drawn from earlier case law:
(1) Whether or to what extent the taxpayer justifiably relied on settled
prior law or policy and whether or to what extent the putatively
retroactive regulation alters that law;
(2) The extent, if any, to which the prior law or policy has been
implicitly approved by Congress, as by legislative reenactment of
the pertinent Code provisions;
(3) Whether retroactivity would advance or frustrate the interest in
equality of treatment among similarly situated taxpayers; and
(4) Whether according retroactive effect would produce an inordinately
harsh result. 79
Under the above criteria, the Anderson, Clayton court approved the
retroactive application of the regulation in question, finding that it did
not alter prior settled law."° The Fifth Circuit factors have since been used
by the Sixth Circuit in Wilson v. United States.8 Despite the efforts of
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the courts have not established specific criteria
for the abuse of discretion review, other than the common element of
extremely harsh result or unfairness to the taxpayer.
C. Equitable Estoppel
The equitable estoppel concept is also called quasi-estoppel and tax
estoppel.8 2 Equitable estoppel involves reliance and detriment resulting
from a government ruling.83 The theory has had some success in the area
of agent misrepresentations.8 4 In the area of retroactive application of
Treasury Regulations, however, the doctrine has been severely limited
by the Supreme Court decisions in Auto Club of Michigan85 and Dixon.86
In Auto Club of Michigan, the Supreme Court sustained the Commis77. 517 F. Supp. 918, 923-25 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aft'd, 688 F.2d 819 (3rd Cir. 1982).
78. 562 F.2d 972, 981 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978). The Anderson, Clayton
factors were drawn respectively from the following cases: Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
306 U.S. 110 (1939); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct.
Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966); and Woodward v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 332
(W.D. Va.), aff'd, 445 F.2d 1406 (4th Cir. 1971). 562 F.2d at 981.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 981-82.
81. 588 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir. 1978).
82. [1979] T.M. 171 2nd at A-I (BNA). The terms are apparently used interchangeably.
83. See, e.g., Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 1001.
84. See, e.g., Interstate Fire Insurance Co. v. United States, 215 F Supp. 586, 597 (E.D. Tenn.
1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1964); Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir.
1962). Agent misrepresentations include oral or written statements by an IRS agent to a taxpayer.
85. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
86. 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
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sioner's retroactive revocation of the taxpayer's exemption that had been
granted by an earlier private ruling.87 The Supreme Court held that " [t]he
doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law." 88
In Dixon, the taxpayers were members of a partnership which had
purchased short-term noninterest-bearing notes from issuers at a discount
from the full value. 89 The partnership sold some of the notes before the
end of the tax year, but after holding them for more than the six month
capital gain holding period.' The taxpayers reported the gain as longterm capital gain. 9 The taxpayers contended that, in purchasing the notes,
they had relied on the Commissioner's published acquiescence in Caulkins
v. Commissioner.92 The acquiescence had been withdrawn by the Commissioner after the transactions had taken place.93 Citing the earlier Auto
Club of Michigan decision,94 Dixon held that the Commissioner may
retroactively correct a mistake of law in the application of tax laws to
particular transactions, and that he can do so even where the taxpayer
has relied, to his detriment, on the Commissioner's mistake.95
Auto Club of Michigan' and Dixon9 7 have effectively precluded direct
application of the equitable estoppel doctrine to bar Commissioner discretion to apply regulations retroactively.9 8 The estoppel elements of reliance and detriment, however, have been very important, if not essential,
to a finding of abuse of discretion.9 Until very recently, the few cases
finding abuse of discretion have largely rested on these equitable principles. "0
D. IBM and LeSavoy
Two of the leading abuse of discretion cases are LeSavoy and IBM. A
87. 353 U.S. at 183.
88. Id.
89. 381 U.S. at 69.
90. Id.at69-70.
91. Id.at70.
92. 1 T.C. 656, affid 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944). The nonacquiescence was published in 19551 Cum. Bull. 7 and Rev. Rul. 55-136, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 213.
93. 381 U.S. at 70-71.
94. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
95. 381 U.S. at 72-73.
96. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
97. 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
98. However, a narrow exception was recognized in Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311
(9th Cir. 1962), and Zuanich v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428 (1981) where "a governmental determination force[d] a disinterested third party to take an irreversible action." 77 T.C. at 433.
99. With the exception of the equal treatment cases, virtually all of the cases finding abuse of
discretion have contained elements of reliance and detriment. See, e.g., LeSavoy, 238 F.2d 589.
American Plywood Association v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D.
100. See, e.g., id.;
Wash. 1967).
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thorough analysis of these two cases will clarify the abuse of discretion
standard as developed by the courts and provide a reference for comparison to the recent cases of LeCroy Research Systems Corp. v. Com03
missioner,"° ' Baker v. United States'°2 and Elkins v. Commissioner.'
These three cases are a significant extension of the abuse of discretion
review developed in LeSavoy and IBM.
LeSavoy involved a charitable foundation granted a certificate of exemption from tax on July 31, 1945. o4 In 1946, the foundation acquired
Clover Spinning Mills, an enterprise which manufactured cotton yam and
cloth.' °5 On its 1946 income tax return, the foundation disclosed the
purchase and the gross receipts that resulted from the sale of yam and
cloth." The return fully and fairly disclosed the active business.' 7 In
1951, the Commissioner revoked the certificate of exemption retroactively
to 1946 and imposed a deficiency for the years 1946 to 1948 and 1950.'08
The foundation submitted its financial statement to the court, showing
net assets of $665,000, whereas, the total deficiency claimed was $903,000,
which included penalties for failure to file and negligence. "0The Third
Circuit invoked the abuse of discretion standard of review."' The court
held that the Commissioner had exceeded the bounds of permissible
discretion "when the Commissioner changed his mind as to the exemption
to be granted this foundation and made it liable for a tax bill so large as
to wipe it out of existence."'
The key fact in LeSavoy that distinguishes it from most cases and
enabled the court to find abuse was the size of the tax bill in relation to
organization assets. The court was unwilling to impose the harsh result
of wiping out a charitable organization, at least where the organization
had been above board and honest in its dealings with the Service. The
court noted that charitable enterprises are met with legislative favor and
that there was nothing improper with the manner in which the organization
had distributed its money so that the court would "look twice" before
allowing retroactivity." '2
LeSavoy did not provide explicit criteria for review, but did set a very
high standard for adverse impact on taxpayers that has persisted until
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

751 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984).
81 T.C. 669 (1983).
238 F.2d at 590.
Id.
Id.at 592.
Id.
Id.at 590.
Id.
Id.at 593.
Id.at 594.
Id.at 590.
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today. Since LeSavoy, the decisions have focused on the effect on the
taxpayer. If the consequence is severe, the taxpayer may avoid retroactive
effect and the resulting tax." 3 If the result is not severe, the judicial
attitude has been that the taxpayer received the benefit for awhile, but
now must pay. "4
IBM and the other equal treatment cases are an exception to the harsh
result requirement for a finding of abuse of discretion." 5 Like LeSavoy,
IBM articulated a new area of law which has generated more discussion
than judicial reliance and can be said to stand somewhat apart from other
cases.
In IBM, IBM's competitor, Remington Rand, received a private ruling
that certain computers would not be subject to a business machines excise
tax." 6 IBM learned of the ruling and applied for a similar ruling which
it never received." 7 In reliance on the ruling, the competitor received a
refund and did not pay the excise tax for five years." 8 Meanwhile, IBM
paid the tax. 9 The IRS revoked the Remington Rand ruling prospectively
and rejected the IBM application for a similar ruling. 2 ° The Court of
his discretion in
Claims determined that the Commissioner had abused
2
treating similarly situated taxpayers differently.' '
There are several factors in IBM that are noteworthy. First, the court
did not look to the effect on IBM beyond the fact that IBM had to pay
a tax. 122 The court emphasized the unfairness of the treatment IBM received compared to its competitor, Remington Rand, rather than analyzing
the impact of the tax on IBM. 123 The decision includes considerable detail
regarding the substantial efforts made by IBM to get a ruling, without
result, as compared to the response to Remington Rand. 24 Second, the
unfairness in treatment between IBM and Remington Rand was heightened by the fact that they were each other's sole competitor in this
particular market. 125 Third, IBM conceded that its computers were taxable
as business machines under the statute, but the Court of Claims was
113. See, e.g., Elkins, 81 T.C. at 680.
114. See, e.g., Manocchio, 78 T.C. at 1002.
115. Other equal treatment cases include Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 659 (Ct. CI.
1981); Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Farmers and Merchants' Bank v.
United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973).
116. 343 F.2d at 916.
117. Id. The Court does not explain why IBM did not receive a ruling.
118. Id.
119. Id.at 917.
120. Id.at 916.
121. Id.at 921.
122. Id.at 923.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 921-23. Remington Rand received its response in two days.
125. Id. at 921.
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willing to overlook this due to the unfair disparity in treatment. 16 In this
rare case, the interest of fairness prevailed over the needs of the public
treasury. "Curbing tax collection in the interest of equality, where Congress has so decreed, is as much a27part of the internal revenue laws as
the affirmative exaction of taxes. ,
Finally, the court found that the Service must have known that it could
not equalize the tax by requiring Remington to pay the tax for the past
period. 28 Under Section 1 108(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926, Remington
was exempt from paying the tax for the period the private ruling was in
effect. 29 Section 1 108(b), no longer part of the Code, at that time barred
retroactivity for the tax if there was a regulation, ruling or Treasury
decision in effect holding that the sale or lease of such article was not
taxable. ,30
The IBM facts were extreme. There were only two competitors, they
were treated very differently and the Commissioner could not have achieved
equality by taxing Remington. While Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion statement that "the Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax
another without some rational basis for the difference" '' has been widely
quoted, courts have been reluctant to extend the application of the equal
treatment approach where it would have large scale effect. 32 One commentator has remarked that a small group may be a requirement for its
use.' 33 Given the potential for spawning litigation and the imposition of
an impossibly high standard of administrative consistency, it is understandable that the courts have been reluctant to expand IBM.
LeSavoy and IBM provide only a limited review of Commissioner
discretion. In LeSavoy, the focus is the effect on the taxpayer rather than
the Commissioner conduct, where it more properly belongs. In IBM the
facts were so extreme and narrow that courts have been reluctant to follow
the holding. The unfortunate consequence has been that taxpayers with
only the most extreme cases have been able to find relief from retroactivity.
V. TAX POLICY AND RETROACTIVITY
The taxpayer and the Commissioner have divergent interests in the
area of retroactivity. These divergent interests are frequently in tension
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
sioner,
133.

Id. at 925.
Id. at 919.
Id.at 921.
Id.
Id.at 921-22.
United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. CI. 1965); and Davis v. Commis65 T.C. 1014 (1976). Cf. Baker, 748 F.2d at 1465, discussed infra, Part VI, A New View.
[1979] T.M. 171, 2nd at A-22 (BNA).
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and must be balanced against each other under the abuse of discretion
test.
The government interest lies generally in the efficient collection of the
public revenue. Retroactivity can promote this broad purpose by providing
uniformity in treatment by reaching back to prior years. Retroactivity
gives the Commissioner discretion to amend regulations in reaction to
newly discovered mistakes, internal policy changes and external changes
in ways of doing business. Retroactivity can also prevent taxpayers from
taking advantage of newly discovered mistakes and ambiguities in the
tax law. Further, retroactivity can provide guidance to taxpayers for reporting under our self-assessment system.
Other government interests may be a reduced need to timely adopt or
amend regulations or to ensure validity of issued regulations. Discretionary authority largely mitigates these needs. This conclusion seems to
be borne out by the delay in the issuance of new regulations. In 1985,
there were about 460 projects to draft regulations at the Service, with
some of the projects addressing issues that had been before the agency
since the early 1970's.' 34
The taxpayer, on the other hand, seeks to rely on existing regulations
for guidance in his tax planning. The regulation is the official IRS interpretation of a given code section. The IRS encourages the taxpayer to
rely on regulations, and the Commissioner has unofficially informed him
may be penalized for negligent
that he may do so.' 35 Further, the taxpayer
13 6
regulations.
of
disregard
or intentional
If an entirely new concept is incorporated into the tax law, it is reasonable to expect that the Secretary may need time to decide how to deal
with the new concept in the regulations. It is also reasonable to expect
that errors and problems will need to be corrected or addressed in subsequent versions.
However, taxpayers should be able to rely on official pronouncements
from the agency charged with responsibility for enforcement and application of the tax laws and they should not be "bushwhacked"' 37 by a
later change. The Commissioner, in an unofficial statement, has stated
that regulations are applied retroactively only where it would benefit
taxpayers and applied only prospectively if it would adversely affect the
taxpayers. 138 While this may be generally true, the continuing volume of
taxpayer litigation on the issue and the general concern among the com134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 98, No. 15, at 80, April 22, 1985.
Rogovin, supra note 6.
Internal Revenue Code Section 6653(a) provides a penalty equal to 5% of the underpayment.
See, e.g., LeCroy Research System Corp., 751 F.2d at 128.
Rogovin, supra note 6.
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mentators indicate that there are important exceptions to this statement. 139
In the interest of fairness, trust and confidence in the tax system, a
taxpayer ought to be able to rely on a reasonable interpretation of a statute
until such time as regulations are issued. Once issued in final form, a
taxpayer ought to be able to rely on regulations until such time as they
are changed. A taxpayer generally should not have to rely on the legal
fictions of the reenactment doctrine or longstanding regulation doctrine
to bolster an otherwise valid regulation.
Of course, there are circumstances where retroactivity is appropriate.
Technical corrections to mathematical errors or omissions, pro-taxpayer
changes, and corrections of obvious inconsistencies that would not cause
reliance can fairly be corrected and applied to earlier events.
The role of the courts should be to actively scrutinize Commissioner
conduct for abuse of discretion. Rather than inquiring whether a taxpayer
actually relied on a regulation, the court should more properly inquire
whether it would have been reasonable for a taxpayer to do so. Rather
than looking for a harsh taxpayer result to justify a rare finding of abuse,
the courts should look to the purpose and scope of the change. If the
change prohibits a previously permitted position, the taxpayer ought to
be entitled to that prior position. If the purpose of the regulation was to
induce reliance, the Commissioner should be held to the regulation without putting the taxpayer to the burden of proving reliance.
With the myriad complexities of modem tax law, taxpayers and their
lawyers and accountants need certainty and reliability in rules and regulations. For a self assessment tax system to work, a high level of trust
and confidence must be established and maintained. That trust and confidence is eroded each time a taxpayer is "bushwhacked" by a subsequent
and unforeseeable change in the regulation and finds no relief in court.
The long-range benefits are being forsaken for short-range revenue increases.
VI. A NEW VIEW
The recent cases of LeCroy Research Systems Corp. v. Commissioner,4 0
Baker v. United States'4 ' and Elkins v. Commissioner42 have more closely
scrutinized Commissioner conduct for abuse of discretion. The LeCroy
court shifted the focus of judicial review of retroactive application cases
139. See, e.g., Nolan and Thuronyi, supra note 6; Comment, supra note 25; Griswold, A Summary
of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REv. 398 (1941). These commentators all express concern
with excessive or abusive use of the authority to apply regulations retroactively.
140. 751 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
141. 748 F.2d 1465 (1lth Cir. 1984).
142. 81 T.C. 669 (1983).
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from the conduct of the taxpayer to that of the Commissioner. The Baker
court extended the Commissioner's duty to treat equally similarly situated
taxpayers. In Elkins, the court concentrated on the Commissioner's duty
to inform, rather than his power to exercise discretionary authority. These
cases demonstrate a new trend that is less tolerant of unfair retroactive
effect. The most significant break with the traditional view occurred in
LeCroy.
A. LeCroy Research Systems Corp. v. Commissioner
In LeCroy, a Handbook published by the Treasury had expressly stated
that rules contained therein would be modified only prospectively, but
the Commissioner nevertheless adopted regulations retroactively that altered time periods stated in the Handbook.' 4 3 The Second Circuit held
that the Commissioner had abused his discretion.1' The LeCroy court
considered the Handbook statement to be an "unusual commitment","
and a "promise"' 4 6 and carefully limited the scope of its ruling, stating
that absent this assurance of prospectivity to taxpayers, the regulation
could have clearly been imposed retroactively. "
The LeCroy decision is important for several reasons. First, the court
shifted its review from the actions of the taxpayer to those of the Commissioner. 4 ' This shift in review of conduct from the taxpayer to the
Commissioner is significant. Earlier decisions bowed to the Commissioner's discretionary authority under Section 7805(b) and focused on
the taxpayer to determine if there was a reason to limit the authority. "'
143. 751 F.2d at 127. LeCroy concerned an appeal by the taxpayer from the Tax Court to the
Second Circuit regarding qualification as a Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC). LeCroy
had formed a wholly owned subsidiary to act as a nonexclusive commissions agent for LeCroy's
export sales. In 1982, the Commissioner sent a notice of deficiency to LeCroy for failure to meet
the 95% qualified export assets test because the commissions receivable were not paid by LeCroy
to its subsidiary within sixty days of the end of the tax year, as required by Treasury Regulation
Section 1.914-1(e)(3)(i), which had been proposed before but promulgated after the transactions in
question. Under I.R.C. Section 482, all of the subsidiary's income (only part of which was currently
taxable as a DISC) was reallocated and taxed as income to its parent, LeCroy. The Tax Court relied
on its decision in CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054 (1982), affid 755 F.2d 790 (11th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3271 (1986), in holding the regulation valid as enacted and as
retroactively applied and further approved the reallocation of income as a proper exercise of Commissioner discretion. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the retroactive application, holding
that it was an abuse of discretion because the Handbook had expressly promised that rules set forth
in the Handbook would be modified in regulations or other Treasury publications to apply only
prospectively if the results would be adverse to taxpayers. LeCroy, 751 F.2d at 127.
144. Id. at 128.
145. Id. at 126.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 126-28.
149. See supra Part IV, Case Development.
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Instead, LeCroy examined the actions of the Commissioner to determine
0
if they were fair under the circumstances, 15
and concluded that the Commissioner could not renege on the Handbook statement because it was a
promise. 5 ' The court said that retroactivity in this case "smells of a
bushwhack.' 52 The court did not discuss the harsh impact on the particular taxpayer. Further, the court specifically held that retroactivity was
barred regardless of whether the taxpayer actually relied upon the Handbook statement. 3 The estoppel elements of reliance and detriment are
completely eliminated as bases for this decision.54
Second, LeCroy established new criteria for review, focusing on fairness of the Commissioner's actions in place of the traditional estoppeltype review involving harsh impact upon and reliance by the particular
taxpayer. 15' The court justified the decision on grounds of fairness to the
taxpayer and preservation of Congress' power to use the tax code for
quasi-regulatory purposes. 56 The court validly pointed out that if the
Commissioner had the unbridled discretion to dishonor deliberately created expectations, taxpayers would be deterred from taking advantage of
the proffered tax benefits designed to encourage a particular activity.'57
The court is correct that fairness redounds to the benefit of the Commissioner as well as the taxpayer.
Third, LeCroy is important because the court bound the Secretary to
statements made in a Handbook that had considerably less indicia of
formality and law than other Treasury decisions such as regulations and
revenue rulings. 5 ' In addition, LeCroy held the Secretary to the Handbook
150.
151.
152.
153.

751 F.2d at 127.
Id.at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
The court said:
We also believe that retroactive application of this regulation is barred without
regard to whether the taxpayer in question actually relied upon the Handook's
[sic] promise. The prospect of litigation over factual issues such as whether
the exports in question would have occurred anyway or whether a particular
company relied upon the Handbook is almost as much a deterrent to such
transactions as the power of the Commissioner to dishonor such promises.

Id.
154. Id. at 127-28. The court discusses harsh impact upon businesses generally, rather than any
harsh impact upon this particular taxpayer. Cf.LeSavoy, 238 F.2d at 594.
155. 751 F.2d at 128.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. In January of 1972, shortly after the DISC provisions had been enacted, the Secretary issued
a Treasury pamphlet entitled "Handbook for Exporters" intended to aid businesses in understanding
the DISC provision. (1972-1 C.B. 679). It consisted of three sections; the first two were intended
as plain language overviews of and discussions about DISCs and the third section set forth more
technical guidance to potential incorporators of DISCs. The Handbook specifically stated that the
Treasury would follow the procedures in the third section "until such time as they may be modified
in regulations or other Treasury publications." Id. at 124.
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statements notwithstanding conflicting published proposed regulations.' 5 9
The court said that it was "not dealing with an informal Treasury statement
relating to the interpretation of a particular provision of the Code which
is revised after further consideration." 160 It is not clear where LeCroy
draws the line between a formal statement such as the Handbook, and
an informal statement. It does seem clear that if a Handbook is a sufficiently formal statement to induce taxpayer acceptance and reliance, then
Treasury decisions with legislative authorization under Section 7805(b),
such as regulations and revenue rulings, surely should qualify under
LeCroy if the statement is sufficiently like a promise.
Apart from the above remark, the court gives no consideration to the
form of the statement. The LeCroy distinction between a formal and an
informal statement is a sharp break with the traditional view, which looks
largely to legislative authorization for the type of statement 6 ' and provides
different levels of acceptable reliance for different categories of statements. 6 ' The traditional view would characterize the Handbook as an
informal statement that could not be relied upon, particularly where conflicting proposed regulations had been issued.' 63
A taxpayer should be able to reasonably rely on private letter rulings
or other private decisions made under his specific factual circumstances,
so long as he fully and fairly represented those facts to the Service; and
a taxpayer should be able to reasonably rely on general public statements
where those statements reach a certain level of formality, such as regulations. LeCroy, as well as looking to the content of the statement (promise) and the intended effect (reliance on the promise by taking action that
would further legislatively determined worthwhile goals) also should have
provided guidance regarding form of the communication.
The LeCroy court was careful in limiting the breadth of its holding
through characterization of the statement as an "unusual commitment"
and a "promise."'" 6 The specific statement that no adverse regulations
would be imposed retroactively is unusual.' 65 Future decisions may distinguish LeCroy on the basis that taxpayers were not promised prospec159. Id. at 127. The court said that proposed regulations are only made for comment and have
no legal effect until adopted. However, as compared to an unofficial Handbook, proposed regulations
would seem to have more indicia of law and formality.
160. Id. at 127.
161. See, e.g., CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054, (1982), aff'd, 755 F.2d 790
(11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 160 S.Ct. 3271 (1986), where the court said that Treasury publications
such as the Handbook, which purport to provide a general explanation of the revenue laws, are
simply guidelines for taxpayers and do not bind the Commissioner in subsequent litigation.
162. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. Section 601.201(l)(1) (1986) (allowing only the taxpayer receiving
a private letter ruling to rely on it).
163. See, e.g., Adler v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964); CWT Farms, Inc., 79 T.C.
1054.
164. 751 F.2d at 126.
165. Id.
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tivity, and therefore, ran the risk of retroactivity. However, on a more
fundamental level, the statement was designed to induce taxpayer investment in a particular activity by providing certain tax benefits.' 66 It
appears that regulations issued for such quasi-regulatory purposes, by
providing a given result for certain behavior, are intended to induce
reliance and should not be treated differently than the "promise" considered in LeCroy.
The LeCroy decision is most noteworthy for its attention to government
conduct. As taxpayers and tax professionals attempt to negotiate the
minefield of the Internal Revenue Code, fairness dictates that generally,
the rules of the game should not be changed after the game has begun. 67
'
Statements intended to guide taxpayers ought to be able to be relied on
by taxpayers and, by and large, if the taxpayer receives a windfall as a
result of a mistake, so be it. There are many instances within the tax
code where a deduction or credit is granted in recognition of a perceived
worthwhile objective.' s Recognition should be given to taxpayer trust
and confidence, and fairness in administration of the system as an equally
worthwhile social goal with a certain tax cost. The burden of correctness
should be on the professionals who administer, interpret and apply the
system, not on the taxpayer.
Where regulations are not issued until after the statute is adopted, there
may be diverse results and varying interpretations until the regulations
are promulgated. If the interpretations are reasonable under the statute,
such diversity can generally be tolerated. If it cannot, temporary regulations can be issued. 69
Finally, it must be noted that there is currently a conflict among the
circuits. CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner7 ° has been decided since
LeCroy. 7 ' In CWT, the Eleventh Circuit also characterized the Handbook
statement as a promise, but proceeded to apply a traditional analysis. The
166. Id. at 127. The court said:
[W]e are not dealing with the ordinary case of legislation designed to raise
revenue. Instead, we are confronted with provisions of a quasi-regulatory nature
by which Congress intended to sacrifice revenue in order to encourage domestic
businesses to devote more of their capital and other resources to the export of
American-made goods. The provisions in question were thus intended to alter
the behavior of firms in certain ways so as to reduce the highly unfavorable
balance of payments.
Id.
167. Becker v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 146, 149 (3rd Cir. 1984) quoting pro se taxpayer remark.
See also, Farmers and Merchants Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973).
168. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L.No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), repealed many
deductions and credits. Notwithstanding this, numerous deductions and credits remain largely intact
in the Internal Revenue Code.
169. See LeCroy, 751 F.2d at 127.
170. 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3271 (1986).
171. The Tax Court decision in CWT Farms, Inc. was made before LeCroy, however. 79 T.C.
1054 (1982).
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court first said that Treasury publications such as the Handbook, which
purport to provide a general explanation of the revenue laws, are simply
guidelines for taxpayers and do not bind the Commissioner in subsequent
litigation. 7 ' The CWT court then pointed out that LeCroy is inapposite
to the accepted law that taxpayers who rely on Treasury publications do
so at their peril, and that the harm suffered by the taxpayer resulted from
a lack of prudence in not complying with the proposed regulations.' 73
Finally, CWT holds that the regulations did not alter settled prior law and
that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion.' 74
B. Baker v. United States
In rare circumstances, the courts have been willing to find abuse of
discretion by the Commissioner where the result is unequal treatment due
to retroactive application of a new regulation.' 75 Justice Frankfurter's
remark in a concurring opinion that "the Commissioner cannot tax one
and not tax another without some rational basis for the difference" has
led to the rational basis test as the appropriate standard of review for
' While the concept receives considerable discussion,
abuse of discretion. 76
the rational basis test as applied by the courts is generally satisfied and
the tax cases finding discrimination are few in number, involve only a
few parties and have been narrowly applied.' 77
Currently, a number of cases are pending which deal with the unequal
treatment issue in the context of a retroactive disallowance of a tax
deduction for educational expenses taken by veterans enrolled in flight
training courses.' 78 One of these cases is Baker v. United States.' 79
Baker is a second example of the increased focus on governmental
172. 755 F.2d. at 804.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., IBM, 343 F.2d at 921; Farmers and Merchants Bank, 476 F.2d at 409; Baker,
748 F.2d at 1468. Cf. Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Davis v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 1014 (1976), Danly Machine Corp. v. United States, 492 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1974).
176. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
177. Courts have generally been reluctant to follow IBM and the other decisions finding unequal
treatment. Bornstein, 345 F.2d at 560, refused to extend IBM to a case where the taxpayer had not
applied for a ruling. In Danly Machine Corp., 492 F.2d at 33, Judge Wyzanski stated that the
regulation did not constitute an abuse of discretion under Section 7805(b) because it was not possible
to completely avoid arbitrariness in tax matters.
178. In Baker, 748 F.2d 1465 (1 lth Cir. 1984), the government brief on Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc stated that at least 16 other similar cases were pending in the district courts of the Eleventh
Circuit and approximately 150 were pending nationwide. Appellants Suggestion for Rehearing, En
Banc, p. 2.
179. In Baker, the veteran taxpayer was an airline pilot who, received $9,345 in educational
assistance under former U.S.C. Section 1677(b) (repealed 1981). 748 F.2d at 1466. This amount
was statutorily exempt from tax under 38 U.S.C. Section 3101(a). Id. Although the V.A. benefit
was not includible as income, Baker was permitted to deduct the entire amount pursuant to a 1962
revenue ruling, which stated that a deduction for educational expenses need not be reduced by the
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action with a concommitant reduction in emphasis on individual taxpayer
circumstances. 0 The Baker court did not bring into play issues of degree
of taxpayer reliance or harsh result, or indicate willingness to find unequal
treatment only where the number of taxpayers affected was extremely
limited. Nor did the court address the windfall benefit enjoyed by the
taxpayer.
The Baker holding is not substantively different from the holding in
IBM. " ' Baker, however, is a significant expansion upon IBM in terms
of impact. IBM involved only two companies, each the other's sole
competitor in a particular market. ' Baker involved a government administered benefit program with a very large number of recipients.' 83 The
Baker court was willing to impose a significant administrative burden on
the Service in the interest of fairness. 8' 4 As compared with IBM, Baker
also indicates closer scrutiny of governmental action. The IBM facts
indicated very unfair treatment; two identically situated taxpayers were
treated in a markedly different fashion with no effective argument explaining the differential treatment.' 8 5 In Baker, the Commissioner supported his position by pointing to different statutes with different methods
of computation.' 86 Although the rational basis test is a very low level of
amount of educational benefits paid by the V.A. Id. Three years later, the IRS retroactively modified
the prior ruling to provide for nondeductibility of the flight-training expenses. Id. The IRS reasoned
that Section 162(a) did not permit deduction of an expense for which a taxpayer is specifically
reimbursed. Id. With respect to all other V.A. educational benefits, the Commissioner let stand the
prior ruling. Id. The Commissioner distinguished flight-training allowances from payments made
for other educational programs, characterizing flight-training as a tuition reimbursement and the
other payments as a stipend for living expenses, that is, paid without regard to tuition costs. Id.
Later, the IRS changed its position regarding the payments made for other educational programs,
ruling that no veteran may deduct amounts expended for educational programs that are allocable to
tax free benefits paid by the V.A. Id. This later ruling, however, was given only prospective
application. On cross motions for summary judgment, IRS argued that the rational basis for unequal
treatment lay in the differences in methods used to compute the benefits for flight-training courses.
Id. Whereas, flight-training reimbursement under former 38 U.S.C. Section 1677(b) was treated as
a direct reimbursement for money expended for tuition, general educational benefits under 38 U.S.C.
Section 1682(a)(1) were computed on the number of the veterans' dependents and the degree of
participation in a course. Id. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that IRS had abused its discretion by
retroactive enforcement of the modified revenue ruling because there was no rational basis for
distinguishing the flight-training expenses from other educational expenses. Id. at 1470. The court
concluded that Congress had created only one educational assistance allowance and that the recipients
all should receive similar treatment. Id.
180. The first example was LeCroy Research Systems Corp. v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 123 (2d
Cir. 1984).
181. IBM, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
182. Id. at 916-17.
183. 748 F.2d at1466.
184. The administrative burden imposed requires consistent treatment among numerous taxpayers.
See supra, note 178.
185. IBM, 343 F.2d at919. The Government argued that IBM could not rely on a ruling granted
toRemington Rand, but did not advance a reason for the disparate treatment.
186. 748 F.2d at 1468.
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scrutiny,' 87 the Baker court was willing to look beyond the face of the
statutes, find a common underlying purpose and conclude that the recipients should receive equal treatment.' 88 Baker, therefore, is a significant
expansion upon IBM.
The Baker view, focusing on the government action rather than on
extreme unfairness to the taxpayer, can be contrasted with the traditional
view in the recent cases of Manocchio v. Commissioner'89 and Becker v.
Commissioner,"9 both involving similar facts and identical legal issues.
The Manocchio court, consistent with the great majority of retroactivity
cases, concluded that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion
under either an estoppel or an equal treatment analysis. On the estoppel
issue, the Tax Court found reasonable reliance but concluded that the
taxpayer had not suffered sufficient injury to warrant a finding of abuse
of discretion. 9'
On the equal treatment issue, the Tax Court found no abuse of discretion
because there were differences in the way the benefits are computed.' 92
The court did not explain how or why differences in computation of
benefits may have some bearing on retroactivity considerations. In Manocchio, unlike Baker, the court did not analyze underlying intentions and
purposes. The court only observed that different statutes and methods of
187. See, e.g., Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989 (1982), aff'd 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir.
1983).
188. 748 F.2d at 1468.
189. 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g, 78 T.C. 989 (1982). In Manocchio, the taxpayer relied
inter alia on Revenue Ruling 62-213 and on the 1978 edition of Internal Revenue Service Publication
17, id. at 1401, captioned "Your Federal Income Tax," which provided in part as follows: "Veterans.
The deductible educational expenses of a veteran of the Armed Forces are not required to be reduced
by the tax-exempt educational benefits received from the Veteran's Administration." 78 T.C. at 998.
The taxpayer, in reliance thereon, deducted the entire cost of the flight-training course, including
the 90% portion reimbursed by the Veterans Administration. 710 F.2d at 1401. The taxpayer argued
that he had reasonably relied on the revenue ruling to his detriment and that the Commissioner had
drawn an arbitrary distinction between two similarly situated taxpayers, i.e., those receiving benefits
under 38 U.S.C. Section 1681 (general educational benefits determined as a function of enrollment
status and the number of dependents) and those receiving benefits under 38 U.S.C. Section 1677
(flight-training, computed solely as a percentage of the actual cost of the course, without regard to
other factors, such as the veteran's dependents). Id. at 1404.
190. 751 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1984).
191. 78 T.C. at 1002. The Tax Court's language highlights the difficult burden confronting a
taxpayer under the traditional analysis:
[Wihile the facts of this case may evoke some sympathy for petitioner and
other taxpayers who find themselves similarly situated, the law is settled that,
absent highly unusual circumstances, respondent has very broad discretion to
correct a mistake of law in a ruling and to do so with retroactive effect. Here
petitioner can point to no extraordinary injury suffered as a result of his reliance. . . . Nor is it a sufficient injury that petitioner must now disgorge the
windfall tax benefit he received. ...
Id.
192. Id. at 1002-03.
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computation applied and thereupon deferred to the Commissioner's discretion.193 On appeal, Manocchio was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on
the basis that rulings are presumptively retroactive unless otherwise stated. 1
In Becker, decided shortly after Baker, the Third Circuit sided with
the Ninth Circuit's Manocchio decision on the estoppel issue, holding
that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in applying the new
ruling retroactively. "' But, on the equal treatment argument, the Third
Circuit noted the Baker-Manocchio split in authority and remanded the
case to the Tax Court for reconsideration of the issue after the Baker
decision. 196
C. Elkins v. Commissioner
A third, and final, example of the trend observed in Baker and LeCroy
can be found in Elkins v. Commissioner.'97 In Elkins, the Tax Court held
that the Commissioner may have abused his discretion in retroactively
adopting a new definition of the term "party" as used in a regulation to
mean "partner" rather than "partnership," thereby precluding the taxpayer's use of a deduction for accrual of mineral royalties.' 98 The Elkins
court focused on the Commissioner's duty to inform rather than discretion
to apply the new definition retroactively to the taxpayer.'" Under the
traditional analysis of Dixon and Auto Club of Michigan, the retroactive
193. Id.
194. 710 F.2d at 1404.
195. 751 F.2d at 152.
196. Id.
197. 81 T.C. 669 (1983). Elkins involved an existing limited partnership named lager Partners
which was obligated to pay coal royalties, although lager was not yet producing coal. Id. at 671.
On October 29, 1976, proposed amendments to regulations were announced which generally prohibited the accrual of mineral royalties in advance of production. Id. at 675. The proposed regulations
were not to apply to royalties under a lease which was "binding" prior to October 29, 1976 on the
"party who in fact pays or accrues such royalties." Id. The taxpayer became a limited partner
sometime between November 29th and the year end. Id. at 673. In December, 1977, the regulations
were issued in final form. Id. at 676. The effective date provisions of the Treasury decision stated
that the "party" who was required to be bound by October 29, 1976 was "the partner, not the
partnership." id. (quoting T.D. 7523, 1978-1 C.B. 192.) The court viewed the taxpayer's definition
of the "party" as the partnership to be the "more reasonable" interpretation. 81 T.C. at
198. Id. at 681.
199. The court said:
The Secretary's discretion to apply his regulations retroactively is very broad,
but its counterpart is the responsibility to provide taxpayers with adequate
guidance as to the extent to which his power will be exercised, or at the very
least to avoid misleading them. This he has not done in the present case. We
think that it was unreasonable of the Secretary to require taxpayers to divine
his meaning in using the word 'payor' and the clause 'party who in fact pays
or accrues such royalties' without informing them prior to their investment that
the words did not mean what they said.
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change would have been permissible as the correction of a mistake of
law. 2
The Elkins court, however, was unwilling to go as far as the LeCroy
and Baker courts on the hardship and reliance issues. It determined that
a finding of injury and reliance were necessary to hold for the taxpayer
and remanded the case for decision as to those questions. 21
A number of other courts, including the Eleventh Circuit in Wendland
v. Commissioner, °2 the Ninth Circuit in Redhouse v. Commissioner,2 °3
and the Tax Court in Wing v. Commissioner,2° have considered the retroactive application of the regulation in question. Elkins specifically distinguished Wendland and Wing because the partnerships affected by the
regulation in those cases were not formed before October 29, 1976, the
effective date of the new regulation. 2 5 The same valid distinction can
also be made for Redhouse. In Redhouse, Wing and Wendland the proposed regulation had been issued and there were no conflicting government statements, as in LeCroy, or retroactive application prior to any
effective notice as in Baker. Hence, the government conduct was fair.
VII. CONCLUSION
Historically, the Commissioner has been accorded extraordinary discretion under Section 7805(b) to apply regulations retroactively. Courts
generally focused on the effect on the taxpayer and denied retroactivity
only in cases of extreme hardship or unfairness.
Recently, some courts have indicated the use of an elevated level of
scrutiny under the traditional abuse of discretion review. While the articulated scope of review has not changed, there is a growing emphasis
on Commissioner conduct and a lessening of the requirement that the
taxpayer rely, to his own detriment, on a Commissioner decision. The
trend is observed in LeCroy, Baker and Elkins. LeCroy focused exclusively on the conduct of the Commissioner, holding that where the Commissioner had publicly promised taxpayers a particular result, the
200. See supra Part IV, Case Development. Elkins attempts to distinguish the Dixon approach in
a footnote, by characterizing the change as "the purely administrative matter of when a new regulation
is to take effect." 81 T.C. at 681 n.20. The distinction is not convincing. If the first definition of
"party" as the partnership was in error, then the Commissioner, under the Dixon and Auto Club of
Michigan approach, had discretion to correct the error retroactively through its new definition of
"party" as the partner. To relegate the change to the category of purely administrative matters
unfortunately sidesteps the issue.
201. Id. at 681-82.
202. Wendland v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 580 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
203. Redhouse v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034
(1984).
204. Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17 (1983).
205. 81 T.C. at 675-76.
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Commissioner would be held to that promise, even though the statement
was contrary to proposed regulations. Baker extended the requirement
that the Commissioner give similarly situated taxpayers equal treatment,
even where many taxpayers are involved. Elkins discussed not only the
Commissioner's powers to apply regulations retroactively, but also his
duties to inform the public about the extent to which regulations will be
made retroactive.
The trend observed in LeCroy, Baker and Elkins moves away from
formalistic notions that regulations merely interpret law. The trend further
recognizes the importance regulations play in tax planning and the difficulties encountered when regulations cannot be relied upon or are late
in their issuance.
At this juncture, this trend represents a small but growing minority
position. The courts should continue in the LeCroy, Baker and Elkins
approach, actively scrutinizing the conduct of the Commissioner with
due regard for fairness to the taxpayer.

